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I. INTRODUCTION: TALKING AND TEXTING
We can talk or we can text.
What do I mean by that? We can talk—we can have a conversation.
He says, she says, I say, you say. We can text—we can write it down
and send it off, preferably by Instant Messenger, or email, for sure,
but also by snail mail, op/ed, or law review article. We can text by
rule, by statute, by opinion, or even by constitution. That is what this
is about—constitutional texting. Let us look at constitutional texting
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in the context of Steve Smith’s discussion of how the law means in
Law’s Quandary.1
We can talk or we can text.
How do we mean by talking? Suppose we talk. We utter some
words, maybe in the form of complete sentences, maybe not. When
we talk, we say and we mean. What we say might be what we mean.
We might say what we mean, but we might not. Suppose we say in
sentences. Our sentences have meanings—meanings in plain English;
sentence meanings. But what we mean by our sentences is not
necessarily what the sentences mean in plain English. Later on in this
essay I am going to say, “Here is the roadmap.” But I will not refer to
a map of any road. No roads. No maps. But you will understand
what I mean. You will know that the roadmap is no map of a road. It
is an outline of the article. Oops. Not exactly an outline, but like an
outline. A roadmap. You know what I mean.
When we talk, we can say one thing but mean another. I can say
“roadmap” and mean, well, you know. Or at least most of you know.
Some of you may have never read a law review article before, but you
have read essays and know about roadmaps. Or you can guess. Even
if you could not guess, by now you would know that what I said is not
exactly what I meant.
Someone asks me to evaluate a former student. I say, “She
regularly attended class, and asked lots of questions.” What do I
mean? You know what I mean. You know that I mean that she was a
mediocre student. Oh, and I knew you would know. That is why I
said it. In fact, now that you know what I meant, you may be thinking,
“She must be terrible.” Why would you be thinking that? You would
be making an inference from what I did say and what I did not say. I
was asked for an evaluation. I did not say, “She was an excellent
student.” I did not say, “She was a good student.” I said, “She regularly
attended class.” If that is the best thing I could say, you infer, I must
be implying that she was a truly awful student. In fact, you might
think to yourself: “Solum is being cruel. That is a horrible thing to
say.” But of course, I did not say anything horrible. What I said
implied something horrible, given the context of our conversation.
Oh, here is another interesting bit: I might not even mean she attended
class regularly—I might not even know whether she did or did not.
Because I did not say it to mean that—her attendance was not the
point. It is what I said, but not what I meant. Not at all.
We can talk or we can text.

1.
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How do we mean by texting? Texting is a lot like talking. We even
call it “chat.” Of course, legal texting is a bit different, not as immediate
or interactive. But there is an important subset of legal texting that
involves durable and noninteractive text messages. We can text legal
norms—by opinion, by rule, or by statute. Or we can text by
constitution. We can write it down now, and push send to eternity.
Well, not really eternity, but a long time—centuries even. Not just to
our friend, our colleague, our spouse, our significant other. But to a
whole polity, for generations. We can do constitutional texting.
How do we mean by constitutional texting? Constitutional texting
is a lot like talking, but it is not talking. It is texting. And it is not
just any sort of texting. It is constitutional texting. I cannot resist. It
is a constitution we are texting. So, how do we mean by constitutional
texting? That is what this text—the one you are reading now—is all
about. That question and a few others. Like these: How is constitutional
texting like talking? How is it different? How is constitutional texting
like IMing or emailing? How is constitutional texting like statutory
texting? How do we figure out what the Framers meant? And how
about the clauses—the text? What does the text mean and is that the
same as what the Framers meant? And not just “what do the clauses
say?,” but also “what do they imply?” Does the Constitution mean
things it does not say? Does it say things it does not mean?
We can talk or we can text.
In this essay, I want to have a conversation—a textual exchange—
with Steve Smith’s discussion of texting and meaning in Chapter Five
of Law’s Quandary.2 Smith claims that the meaning of legal texts is
“basically identical” with the semantic intentions of the author or
authors. That is the claim I want to engage. We can say what we
intend and we can intend what we say, but these connections are not
necessary in the sense that Smith identifies. My focus will be just a
bit different than Smith’s. He is after global legal meaning, whereas I
am focused on the meaning of constitutional texts.
How is the rest of this text going to go? By “this text” I meant this
whole chunk of law review texting. Here is the roadmap. (I told you
I would say that.) Part II is called “Constitutional Texting” and it sets
the stage—it situates this Article in contemporary constitutional
theory. Part III is “Smith,” and it is about Steve Smith and Law’s
2.

Id. at 101.
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Quandary, as well as Paul Grice’s theory of meaning. Part IV is
called “Framer’s Meaning and Clause Meaning” and it develops a
Gricean and anti-Smithian account of constitutional meaning. Part
V is “Conclusion: How to Do Things with Clauses,” and it wraps
things up.
Enough roadmap. Let’s do things with words.3
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTING
The Constitution is a text message. The Framers texted us. We got
it. We could hardly miss it. There are millions of copies. It is under
glass in the National Archives. It gets some play in high school civics
and American history. It is on the Web. Some folks carry it around—in
their vest pocket, so to speak—although that is not literally what I
mean or maybe, not all I mean. If you are reading this, you probably
had to take “Constitutional Law.” Or maybe you have to teach it. Or
you cannot teach it, but you write about it. Or do it. Practice it.
Interpret it. Apply it.
Of course, not many of us have actually read the whole text
message. It is really long. It is complicated. It is dry and boring. On
a cell phone, it would take thousands of screens to receive it. Maybe
only Akhil Amar4 has read the whole thing seriously. I mean that for
all I know (for sure) Akhil Amar may be the only person in the
history of this Republic to have read the whole Constitution from
beginning to end with the kind of seriousness that would produce full
and deep comprehension.5 (Oh, there must be others. You may be
among them and possibly you are rather annoyed with my ignorance.)
Amar sure seems to have read each and every word of the text
message. I have not. Oh, sure. I have read it. More or less. I have
tried to read every word. But come on. Who can really read the
Twelfth Amendment?6 Once you know that it made sure that there
3. See J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina
Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975).
4. Yale Law School Faculty, Akhil Reed Amar, http://www.law.yale.edu/
faculty/AAmar.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
5. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
(2005).
6. You try reading it straight through for serious and deep comprehension:
. . . The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot
for President and Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an
inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall name in their
ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person
voted for as Vice President; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons
voted for as President and of all persons voted for as Vice President, and of
the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and
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will be no ties between the President and Vice President, why bother
with the details? Unless you have to, because maybe the presidential
election really will end up in the Senate.7 Then you had better read it.
Carefully. Every jot and tittle.8
The Framers texted us. We got the message. We have scanned it.
Read it. Limned it. Glossed it. Interpreted it. Construed it. Applied
it. Some parts are freaky. “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed
to the President of the Senate; The President of the Senate shall, in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates, and the votes shall then be counted; the person having the
greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such
number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no
person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest
numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the
House of Representatives shall choose immediately by ballot the President.
But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the
representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose
shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the States, and a
majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House
of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of
choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next
following, then the Vice President shall act as President, as in the case of
the death or other constitutional disability of the President.
. . . The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President
shall be the Vice President, if such number be a majority of the whole
number of electors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then from
the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose the Vice
President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds of the whole
number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary
to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of
President shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States.
U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
7. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 153 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Twelfth Amendment commits to Congress the authority and responsibility to count
electoral votes.”); ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION 176 (2001);
Michael C. Dorf, Interpretive Holism and the Structural Method, or How Charles
Black Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform and Congressional
Timidity, 92 GEO. L.J. 833, 848 (2004).
8. See Matthew 5:18 (King James) (“For assuredly, I say to you, till heaven
and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle will by no means pass from the law till all is
fulfilled.”); see also Wikipedia, Tittle, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tittle (last visited
June 3, 2007) (“The phrase ‘jot and tittle’ indicates that every small detail has received
attention.”).
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redress of grievances.”9 How cool is that? “No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.”10 Totally aretaic! But what do those
bits of constitutional texting mean?
The Framers texted us. What do we make of the fact that they
texted us. The Framers and ratifiers texted us, but are their purposes,
expectations, or hopes relevant to what we do with their text? They
texted us, but is the plain meaning of the text somehow binding on
us? Does it require translation?11 They texted us. Is it not up to us?
After all, they are dead—as doornails. We have to live with their text
message. Can we not choose what meaning to assign it? Or get
involved in high politics and choose the judges who choose the
meaning?12 Or choose the judges who choose the unmeaning—after
all, it is just a text message. Could we, should we, would we? Delete
it. Redact it. Lose it. Or having lost it, find it again. Restore a lost
constitution?13
Oh, and who is the us in “texted us” anyway? Did they text
everyone—popular texting?14 All three branches—departmentalism?
Just the judiciary branch—judicial supremacy? Just the Supreme
Court—the dictatorship of nine?
Part II is done. Almost. The text said it. Almost. Law review texting
is special. So there was the text and then there were the footnotes.
Lots of them. Do not read them, they are boring, deadly. Unless15

9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365
(1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993);
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT.
REV. 125 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995).
12. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinsion, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
jbalkin/writings.htm#constitutionalrev. By the way, if you are reading this footnote, I
just want to say, read Balkin and Levinson’s article. Really. You will not regret it.
Actually, you might regret it. After all, I do not even know who you are. But you
know what I mean. Right?
13. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004).
14. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); see also Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular?
Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005).
15. The asterisk or “star” footnote is an exception to this general rule. See
Charles A. Sullivan, The Under-Theorized Asterisk Footnote, 93 GEO. L.J.,1093
(2005). But this Article is an exception to the exception. Compare supra note *
(copyright notice and grant of open access license), with supra note ** (traditional
asterisk footnote). The ** footnote is the interesting one. Well, actually, they are
both interesting. But in different ways.
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they are by Balkin16—that is a whole different story.17 But these
footnotes—not by Balkin, that is for sure. Hey! You do not really
even know if they are by me. What is up with that? The footnotes
could have been added by zealous law review editors or my research
assistant. Same thing with opinions, even famous ones—who knows
who writes them. Oh yes, I almost forgot: same thing with the
Constitution—the Constitution of the United States. We do not know
who wrote it in its final form; it happened in the committee of detail.
No records, not many reports about who did what. And who said the
Constitution anyway? Who uttered the Constitution of the United
States? The Framer who drafted each bit of the text in its final form?
The Framers as a corporate body—the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia? The ratifiers—the bigger groups who met to say “yea”
or “nay” in each of the states. And what about, “We the People.”
Did they all say the Constitution? Or do we utter the Constitution?
Are we saying it now? Maybe no one uttered the Constitution. Could
that be right?
It gets kind of complicated. Anonymous texting. Collective texting.
Retexting. Like those text messages from T-Mobile or Verizon. Who
sends those anyway? And if you do not know who sends them, how
do you know what they mean? Hey, I bet they are generated by some
data system—which probably has bugs and generates messages never
contemplated by the geeks who wrote the software. Do those text
messages mean anything at all?
III. SMITH
In Law’s Quandary, Steve Smith addresses the question, “How
does the law mean?” The answer he gives has something in common
with Paul Grice—a recognition of the foundational role of intention.
Let me give a name to Smith’s core position, which I shall call the
“semantic intentions necessity thesis.” Here is how Smith expresses
this idea: “[T]he meaning of a legal text is necessarily given by—

16. Jack M. Balkin Home Page, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/ (last
visited Mar. 26, 2007).
17. See J. M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275 (1989), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/foot1.htm.
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indeed, is basically identical with—the semantic intentions of an
author or authors of some sort.”18
Smith’s thesis requires considerable unpacking. In particular, I
want to focus on the following elements of the thesis: (1) Smith’s use
of the modal concept of necessity and his assertion that his claim of
necessity is “ontological”; (2) Smith’s notion of “meaning”; (3) Smith’s
use of the definite article the to qualify meaning; (4) Smith’s use of
“identity”; and (5) Smith’s notion of semantic intentions.
Let us begin with the term necessarily, the adverbial form of the
noun necessity. To belabor the obvious, necessity is not possibility.
Smith is not claiming that it is merely possible to identify “the
meaning of a legal text” with “the semantic intentions of an author or
authors.” But what does he mean? Modal claims are notoriously
ambiguous. One powerful technique for resolving their ambiguity is
to translate the modal claim using possible worlds semantics. The
phrase, “possible world,” is from Leibniz and it has a technical meaning:
a “possible world” is a possible state of the whole universe—of
everything that is.19 If something is “necessarily true” in the broadest
(or logical) sense, then it is true in all possible worlds. So when
Smith makes a claim about ontological necessity, he seems to be
making a claim about meaning that he asserts is true in all possible
worlds, but he might be making a more limited claim—about only
those possible worlds that are similar to the actual world in some
specified way.
After “necessity” there is “meaning,” and Smith tells us quite a bit
about what he means by meaning. Smith distinguished between
semantic and nonsemantic meaning, and his claim is about semantic
meaning, and not about nonsemantic significations of legal texts.20
There is no good reason to quarrel with this distinction, but it may be
helpful to add another distinction or three. In his famous discussion
18. SMITH, supra note 1, at 101.
19. See generally J OHN D IVERS , P OSSIBLE W ORLDS (2002) (providing a
comprehensive introduction to possible worlds semantics and the metaphysics of
modality); SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980) (discussing necessity);
DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS (1986) (defending modal realism’s
view that our world is one of many, each with its own inhabitants); ALVIN
PLANTINGA, ESSAYS IN THE METAPHYSICS OF MODALITY (Matthew Davidson ed.
2003). The idea of possible worlds was introduced by Leibniz. See GOTTFRIED
WILHELM FREIHERR VON LEIBNIZ, The Theodicy: Abridgement of the Argument
Reduced to Syllogistic Form, in LEIBNIZ: SELECTIONS 509, 509-11 (Philip P. Weiner
ed., Charles Scribner’s Sons 1951). Leibniz used the idea of a possible world in
answer to the argument against the existence of good from the problem of evil. See
id. at 511. The argument is not proven, Leibniz maintained, until it is shown that the
actual world is not the best of all possible worlds. See id.
20. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 103-05.
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of speech acts, Austin distinguishes between three different “acts”
that can be associated with a single utterance.21 First, there is the
locutionary act—the uttering of semantic content.22 So, as I am
typing this sentence, I am using the roman alphabet (which has
syntactic properties that conform to set a rules constituted by a
complex social practice) and I am also saying something, which could
be paraphrased in an indefinite number of ways or translated into
German or Mandarin. Second, there is the illocutionary act—the use
of syntax and semantics to perform actions.23 “Illocutionary uptake”—in
Austin’s felicitous phrasing24—is easy to identify in expressions like
the following: “I [hereby] promise that this essay will be no more
than 15,000 words” or “I [hereby] apologize for being late.” The
“hereby” in brackets may or may not be part of the actual utterance,
but usually if it can be inserted it makes it explicit that the expression
is performing some action. Third, there is the perlocutionary act—the
creation of a reaction through an expression.25 So, if I say, “Duncan
Kennedy will be attending the conference,” you may be surprised,
thrilled, annoyed, or frightened. Smith divides meaning into two kinds—
semantic and nonsemantic.26 By invoking Austin, I mean to suggest
that this dichotomy is truly crude because it focuses exclusively on
locutionary acts and perlocutionary effects, leaving syntax and speech
acts entirely out of the picture.
The next term we need to investigate is the. Smith uses the definite
article the to modify meaning when he expresses the semantics
intentions necessity thesis. This might be an accident, but my reading
is that this was an intentional choice on Smith’s part. By using the
definite article, he means to express an assumption. We contrast the
definite article the with the indefinite article a. If Smith had said “a
meaning of a legal text is necessarily given by—indeed, is basically
identical with—the semantic intentions of an author or authors of
some sort,” then he could have meant that among the possible
meanings of a legal text is the meaning that is identical with the
semantic intentions of the author or authors. By using the definite
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See AUSTIN, supra note 3, at 94-108.
See id. at 94.
See id. at 98-100.
See id. at 117.
See id. at 101-02, 107-10, 118-20.
See SMITH, supra note 1, at 103-05.
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article, he seems to be asserting something like the following: for
each and every legal text, T, there is one and only one meaning, M,
and M is identical with the semantic intentions, I, of some author or
authors, A. In other words, the semantics intentions necessity thesis
incorporates the thesis that all legal texts have one and only one
meaning. Of course, Smith would not deny that texts can have multiple
meanings in some sense. For example, the same legal text can be
interpreted in different ways by different courts. So Smith must mean
that each text has one and only one “true” or “correct” or “real”
meaning.
Next up is identity. Smith asserts that the meaning of a legal text is
“given by” or “identical to” the semantic intentions of an author. I
am not quite sure what Smith means by his identity claim. Here is
one possibility: legal texts do not have truth conditions in the same
way that assertions have truth conditions. But we might analogize to
truth conditions and posit that legal texts have satisfaction conditions.
Thus, a criminal prohibition on action X, is satisfied in circumstances
Y, if no one X’s in Y. Smith might mean that the satisfaction conditions
of any legal text T are identical to the satisfaction conditions of the
author I (A,T), where I is a function that yields a semantic intention, I,
from an author, A, who utters a text token T. Perhaps Smith has
something else entirely in mind, but for purposes of discussion, I will
assume that whatever he has in mind, it follows a similar pattern.
That is, the criteria for application of the legal text will map onto the
criteria for success of the speaker’s semantic intention in a way that
preserves the relationship between criteria and facts about the world.
Finally, we have Smith’s notion of “semantic intention.” Once
again, I am not quite sure what Smith means. Suppose that an author,
A, utters a text, T, in circumstances C. For Smith’s project to get off
the ground, it cannot be the case that A’s semantic intention in
uttering T is simply the purpose of the utterance. The purpose may
have been to produce a particular perlocutionary effect—to scare
someone, for example. But this perlocutionary effect is not the
semantic meaning of T—that is obvious. So semantic intentions
must be something else? But what else? One possibility is that the
semantic intention of a text, T, is itself a semantic entity—a sentence
in the language of thought (mentalese) to borrow Jerry Fodor’s
provocative idea. So the meaning of T is a sentence, S, in mentalese.
It might be the case that S in mentalese is a direct translation from the
natural language in which T is expressed, English, into mentalese.
But this need not be the case. So if I utter the sentence “I agree,” in
English, it might be accompanied by the sentence “[I DO NOT
AGREE]” in mentalese. In which case, the meaning of “I agree” is
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“[I DO NOT AGREE].” And one could truthfully say, “When he said
‘I agree’ he meant ‘I do not agree.’” If Smith’s notion is like this, then
Smith’s thesis might seem to entail that whatever we say, we always
succeed in saying something which corresponds to what we meant.
There is no possible gap, because of the identity relationship between
the text token T and the semantic intention token I. Smith thinks (or
might think) that we necessarily say what we mean.
Lacking direct access to Smith’s semantic intentions, I have done
my best to lay out my reading of the semantic identity necessity
thesis. Of course, Smith may think that I have gotten him wrong.
And he might be right. But whether he is right or not will depend on
what my semantic intentions are—just as much as it depends on his
semantic intentions. And just as I have no direct access to Smith’s
semantic intentions, he lacks direct access to mine. Of course, this
issue is “merely epistemological.” What we mean is one thing; whether
we know what others mean is another. In fact, it is not totally clear
that either Smith or I has direct access to our own semantic intentions.
Semantic intentions do not need to be occurrent thoughts—one can
speak without a sentence in mentalese being present to consciousness.
And this creates the possibility that we do not always know what we
mean, even though what we mean is our own semantic intention.
That is, when we author some text, A, it is possible that the
accompanying I is inaccessible to conscious inspection—our meanings
might be unconscious.
Before we go any further, we need to get a red herring out of the
way. Smith’s discussion of this side issue focuses on an argument
made by Gary Lawson, who argued that the Constitution should be
read like a recipe and that recipes should be read in light of their
original public meaning, as opposed to the private intentions of the
cook (or correspondingly, the Framers).27 Smith responds:
Lawson’s proposition seems positively perverse. After all, if we are reading
the recipe in an effort to cook fried chicken and on the assumption that the
recipe was written by someone who was a specialist in the art, then what we
care about in reading the recipe is what the cook intended. Conversely, we
care not at all about the recipe’s original public meaning—except perhaps as
an aid to figuring out what the cook actually meant.28

27. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J.
1823 (1997).
28. SMITH, supra note 1, at 106.
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There are many things that could be said about this passage, but one
thing is absolutely crucial. This is not an argument in favor of the
semantic intentions necessity thesis. Take a particular recipe—say
the recipe for Mom’s apple pie. As applied to that recipe, the semantic
intentions necessity thesis is that in all possible worlds (or all worlds
in which Mom’s recipe exists), there is one and only one meaning of
the recipe for Mom’s apple pie, and that meaning corresponds to the
semantic intention of the author in that world. If semantic intentions
were sentences in mentalese, then the meaning of a Mom’s recipe just
is the equivalent recipe in Mom’s mentalese. If this were the case,
then it would be silly to talk about how recipes “should be read” or
“what we care about.” These are normative arguments for preferring
one meaning to another, but if the semantic intentions necessity thesis
were true, then the very idea of preferring one meaning to another
meaning is nonsense.
Because Smith’s argument is framed in terms of choice between
one meaning and another, his normative argument against Lawson
presupposes that the semantic intentions necessity thesis is false. At
this point, the principle of charity in interpretation requires us to
interpret Smith’s argument in a way that avoids contradiction. So, let
us assume that Smith means to say, “If it were possible to choose
between public recipe meaning and cook’s intentions recipe meaning,
then we should prefer the latter over the former.” Even fixed in this
way, there is some tension between Smith’s argument and the
semantic intentions necessity thesis: that is because Smith’s argument
seems so reasonable and commonsensical that we are naturally led to
accept that the choice it assumes is a real one. So even though
Smith’s argument in response to Larson does not commit Smith to a
logical contradiction, it does seem to create a tension.
The recipe example is a good one because it provides a marvelous
context in which to test the semantic intentions necessity thesis. But
in order to get at the test, we need to elaborate the example just a bit.
Consider the following hypothetical situation. Let’s call it “Anonymous
Recipe Bank”:
Anonymous Recipe Bank. Imagine that someone sets up an anonymous recipe
bank. Let’s suppose it is on the Internet. Contributors submit their recipe
via a Web page and the recipe is then indexed and classified. Let’s suppose
that Mom submits her recipe for apple pie, which appears in the recipe bank
as follows:
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INGREDIENTS:
1 recipe pastry for a 9-inch double crust pie
3/4 cup white sugar
2 tablespoons all-purpose flour
1/8 teaspoon salt
1 teaspoon ground cinnamon
1/4 teaspoon ground nutmeg
6 tart apples—peeled, cored, and sliced
2 tablespoons butter
2 tablespoons whiskey
DIRECTIONS:
Preheat oven to 450 degrees F (225 degrees C). Fit bottom
crust into a 9-inch pie plate.
In a small bowl, mix together sugar, flour, salt, cinnamon,
and nutmeg. Place sliced apples in a large bowl and sprinkle with
sugar mixture. Toss until apples are thoroughly coated. Spoon
apples into pan.
Dot apples with butter or margarine, then sprinkle with whiskey.
Cover with top crust. Seal edges and cut steam vents in top.
Bake in preheated oven for ten minutes. Lower temperature
to 350 degrees F (175 degrees C) and bake an additional forty
minutes. Serve warm.
The author of the text is Mom; she uploaded the recipe. But because
this is an anonymous recipe bank, we do not know who Mom is. So
we have no way of acquiring particular knowledge of her semantic
intentions. But we do know this: Mom knew that her recipe would be
anonymous. So we know that Mom knew that we would not know
anything about her particular intentions. Mom would know that we
would have to fall back on the ordinary or standard meaning of the
various elements that make up recipe. Mom knows that we could not
know that by “butter,” she means margarine. Mom knows that we
could not know that by “whiskey,” she means rum. So Mom knows
that her recipe will be given its “public meaning” or what Grice might
call its “sentence meaning.”29 So we will interpret Mom’s recipe
by assigning the ordinary meanings to each of the ingredients and

29.

PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 117-37 (1989).
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measures. To coin a phrase, we will interpret Mom’s recipe for apple
pie by using the idea of “recipe meaning” and not the idea of “cook’s
meaning.”
And this is where it gets really interesting. Because it is precisely
at this juncture that Smith can make an intuitive and apparently
persuasive move—a wonderful move. Smith can say, “Yes, and this
example proves my point.” In this situation, we are interpreting Mom’s
intentions. Given the situation, our interpretation is that Mom intended
the words to have their ordinary public meaning. In other words, we
say that the meaning of the recipe is its “recipe meaning” because
“recipe meaning” is “cook’s meaning.” So Smith can argue that
Anonymous Recipe Bank confirms the semantic intentions necessity
thesis.
Or does it? Consider a variation, which we can call Anonymous
Recipe Bank with Mistake.
Anonymous Recipe Bank with Mistake. Mom submits her recipe as before.
But now Mom has made a mistake. Mom has the mistaken belief that the
name of rum is “whiskey.” Mom’s not much of a drinker, she got confused
when she was a small child, and no one has ever corrected her mistake—
although every so often Mom is puzzled by smirks and giggles provoked by
her remarking that the “whiskey” in “whiskey sours” does not taste like
“whiskey” at all. Of course, the recipe bank is anonymous, so when
someone makes Mom’s apple pie, they make it with whiskey and not rum.

Does this variation pose any difficulties for Smith? He has an
obvious move. He can simply say, “The recipe calls for rum, not
whiskey. Rum was Mom’s semantic intention. Of course, it may be
the case that no one (other than Mom) knows that the recipe calls for
rum, but that is just an epistemological problem.”
Now suppose that Mom learns of her mistake. Someone fills her in
on the difference between rum and whiskey. “Oh dear,” Mom says to
herself, “what does the recipe taste like with whiskey?” And then
Mom tries the recipe—and she decides that the pie actually is very
good with whiskey rather than rum. And she now says, “The recipe
that I submitted is not the one that I intended, but it is actually a very
good recipe.” I think it is beyond question that Mom might say
something much like this. That is, she might say that that the recipe
that she wrote is not the recipe that she intended to write. If we asked
her whether someone who used whiskey rather than rum was making
a mistake about the meaning of her recipe, she might say, “No, I
made the mistake. They just followed the recipe.” In other words,
Mom might deny the meaning of her recipe is identical with her
semantic intentions—and thus, she might deny the semantic intentions
necessity thesis.
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But Smith does not need to concede that Mom is right about this.
Smith is entitled to say that Mom is simply mistaken about who is
mistaken. Smith could insist that Mom’s recipe really was for apple
pie with rum and not for apple pie made with whiskey. Of course,
Smith needs to acknowledge that Mom’s way of putting things is
consistent with the way that we ordinarily talk about meaning. But
Smith can say that our ordinary talk is imprecise. Ordinary talk refers
to “pseudo-meanings,” Smith might say. Pseudo-meanings may be
mistaken for real meanings because of epistemic mistakes. But
precisely because it takes a mistake to produce a pseudo-meaning, we
can see that they are not real.
Smith’s move to pseudo-meanings can be illuminated by yet
another variation, which we can call Anonymous Recipe Contest.
Here is how it goes:
Anonymous Recipe Contest. The anonymous recipe bank now holds a
contest for the best apple pie recipe. As before, Mom submits her recipe.
As in the case of Anonymous Recipe Bank with Mistake, Mom writes
“whiskey” but means “rum.” But the rules for the contest were written by
Gary Lawson, and they state explicitly: “The meaning of your recipe will be
determined by the ordinary public meaning of the ingredients and
procedures that you include. The judges of the contest will not consider any
private meanings, no matter how much they improve the recipe.”

Once again, Mom learns of her mistake. Let us suppose that Mom
has been talking with Smith. She emails the organizers of the contest
and instructs them to use rum rather than whiskey when they test her
recipe. Their email in reply states that the she knew the rules and the
rules specified “ordinary public meanings.” Mom replies that this
“cannot be a rule. Because of the semantic intentions necessity thesis,
it is impossible for the recipe to mean anything other than my
semantic intentions.” Mom demands that they follow her recipe, or
call off the contest because of the ontological impossibility of the
contest rules.
Are Mom and Smith right? Is recipe meaning impossible? Is
cook’s meaning necessarily the only meaning? This brings us to
Smith’s “ontological argument.” As Smith puts it, “under the ontological
conceptions that most of us entertain, and in a world in which most of
us have discarded ‘animistic’ notions, persons have the property or
capability of being able to mean.”30 Smith illustrates his thesis with
30.

SMITH, supra note 1, at 108.
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the following case, adapted from Paul Campos, which we shall call
Written in the Sand by the Wind:
[W]hile walking in the desert near the border between the United States and
Mexico, you come across marks in the sand forming the figures “R E A L,”
and you wonder what these marks mean. Your first step will be to guess
whether the marks were made by an English-speaking or Spanish-speaking
agent. If you think the marks were made by an English speaker, you
probably will interpret them to mean something like “real” in the sense of
“actual” or “existing.” If you suppose instead that the marks were made by
someone speaking Spanish, then you will understand them to mean
something like the English term “royal.” But if you think the marks were
made by no one, and were instead simply the fortuitous effect of wind on the
desert sand, then you will not suppose the marks actually mean anything at
all: they are merely a strange accident devoid of meaning. The most you
might do (and this will turn out to be a tremendously important possibility)
is to imagine that if the marks had been made by an English speaker, they
would mean . . . , and so forth. But even here, it is an author (albeit a
hypothetical one), not the marks in themselves or as free-floating entities,
that supplies meaning.31

Of course, there is something quite odd going on here, because Smith
himself seems to use expressions that are inconsistent with his own
thesis. Consider:
• “you wonder what these marks mean”
• “you will probably interpret them to mean”
• “you will understand them to mean.”
In each case, Smith refers to the meaning of the marks and not the
meaning of the author of the marks. That is, Smith’s way of talking
seems to assume that marks have meanings and to deny that meaning
is identical to the semantic intentions of the author. Smith recognizes
this difficulty. Here is what he says about it:
It is surely true that objects (such as marks on a page) can be used by
persons to convey meanings; and so in a shorthand expression we may refer
to the “meaning” of an object (in the same way that we may say, as a
shorthand expression, that the “purpose” of a bus is to transport people, or
that the “purpose” of a hammer is to pound nails). Taken too literally or
simple-mindedly, such statements might seem to lapse into primitive
animism—as in the assertion that “rocks fall because they crave the earth.”
But in fact we readily understand such statements to be shorthand
expressions of more complex propositions, such as “People make and use
hammers to pound nails.”32

If we interpolate Smith’s shorthand expression notion into his own
remarks in Written in the Sand by the Wind, then we see that Smith
would expand each of the statements quoted above as follows:
31.
32.
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• “you wonder what these marks mean” becomes “you will
wonder what the author of these marks meant by them”
• “you will probably interpret them to mean” becomes “you
will probably interpret the author to have meant”
• “you will understand them to mean” becomes “you will
understand the author to have meant”
But now something seems to have gone wrong. The expanded
expressions clearly mean something that is different than the meaning
of the so-called shorthand originals. For example, the expression “the
purpose of a hammer is to pound nails” simply is not equivalent to the
expression “people make and use hammers to pound nails.” Hammers
do have a function that is a function of hammers qua hammers, and
that function is to pound things. The function is a product of human
design and the function enables the use, but the design and use are not
equivalent to the function. So this example not only fails to support
Smith’s shorthand expression notion, it actually undermines it. This
same problem infects the attempt to analyze the expressions from
Written in the Sand by the Wind as shorthand expressions.33 That the
33. In comments on a draft of Smith’s paper, I wrote:
When I say to a student this sentence in your paper means something
quite different than you intended, this is not shorthand for, “You meant
something quite different by using this sentence than you intended to mean
by using this sentence.” Those are two different sentences with two
different meanings. If [Smith were] correct, the first sentence would
reduce to the second and then it seems incoherent. But the first sentence is
coherent and does not reduce to the second.
The difference in meaning is highlighted by noticing that there is a
syntactical difference between the transitive and intransitive forms of the
verb “to mean.” Consider the following examples:
• Sentence tokens of the type “X means Y,” such as “The Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution means that Congress must aim to
promote the progress of science when it modifies copyright terms.”
• Sentence tokens of the type “P means Y by X,” such as “The Framers
meant that the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution
means that Congress must aim to promote the progress of science
when it modifies copyright terms.”
The syntactic difference between the two sentence types suggests a
difference in meaning. Moreover, sentences of the first type are not
reducible to sentences of the second type—for the obvious reason that the
second type includes content omitted in the first type. The fact that our
ordinary language has two different forms (transitive and intransitive) of
the verb “to mean” and that these forms have different semantic content
suggests that sentence of the type “X means Y” are not equivalent to
sentences of the type “P means Y by X.” If they are not equivalent, then I
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meaning of these expressions would be a product of their inscription
by an author does not entail that the meaning of the expressions is
identical to the semantic intentions of the author. Indeed, the fact that
the meaning is a product of the author’s semantic intentions shows
that the meaning is not identical to them. If X is the product of Y,
then X is not identical to Y.
Let me state my own point more directly. It is an obvious fact
about the grammar34 of “meaning” that language, symbols, texts,
speeches, sayings, and other expressions have meanings. That is why
Smith himself talks about the meaning of expressions rather than the
meanings intended by the author. He is simply going with the flow—
conforming to, rather than resisting, the grammar of our concept of
meaning. And that grammar is consistent with most of what Smith
says about the relationship between meaning and authors. There is no
contradiction (or even tension) between the claim that texts mean and
the claim that the meaning of texts is produced by authors. It could
even be consistent with Smith’s much stronger and ambitious claim—
that this connection is a matter of ontological necessity.
Let me begin by returning to Written in the Sand by the Wind.
Consider the following dialog, which comes from comments I made
on a draft of this part of Law’s Quandary:
Does the example get rhetorical force from the ambiguity between Spanish
and English? Suppose for example, you came across the following:

υοµοσ
Now, there is no ambiguity between English and Spanish, but the letters
still might have gotten their shape from the random action of the wind.
“Look,” I say, “Nomos, that means norm or law in Greek.”
You say, “We do not know who or what inscribed those letters in the
sand. It may mean something entirely different or it may mean
nothing at all.”
I say, “Well, it might also mean something different, but that is a
token of the word type Nomos in ancient Greek. It means what it
means, however it came to be.”
You say, “No, you are now becoming the author of that meaning.”
I reply, “Not me. I did not write it in the sand, and anyone else who
knows ancient Greek would recognize the meaning.”
“But you are implicitly attributing an author to those marks,” you say.
“No I am not,” I reply. “No such thought ran through my mind.”
“Well maybe it was a subconscious thought,” you reply.
“Maybe,” I retort, “but you have no evidence for that hypothesis.”
“But what if no one ever came here,” you say, “would it mean
anything then?”
would think that we would ordinarily conclude that sentence tokens of the
first type would not be mere shorthand for sentence tokens of the second
type.
34. I mean “grammar” in the Wittgensteinian sense.

140

SOLUM.DOC

6/12/2007 10:39:06 AM

[VOL. 44: 123, 2007]

Constitutional Texting
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

“Sure,” I say, “it would still mean what it means. Trees that fall in the
forest when no one is listening still make an awful lot of noise.”
“But without an author,” you say, “those would be just a meaningless
set of marks in the sand.”
“Try telling that to someone who can read ancient Greek. There is a
difference between ‘It is all Greek to me,’ and ‘It is a meaningless set
of marks,’” I say.
“But what if it was just the wind?” you say. “Surely it has no meaning
then.”
“Surely, it does,” I say, “It is a well formed expression in ancient
Greek. Its well-formedness is a property of the marks, and not of the
agent that caused the marks to come into being. If the expression is
well formed, it has meaning.”
“Not true meaning,” you say.
“Not intended meaning,” I reply.
“But it is an ontological fact about meaning that true meaning is
intended meaning,” you say.
“No, it is simply a fact of the matter,” I say. “As a matter of fact,
meanings are usually intentional, but nothing guarantees that this must
be so. And sometimes it is not so.”
“You are missing the point,” you reply. “The connection between
semantic meaning and persons is ontological precisely because it is a
necessary property of semantic meaning that it is created by persons.”
“But how do you know that?” I ask.

Is there an ontological and necessary connection between meaning
and the semantic intentions of persons? Smith recognizes that this
claim is problematic:
Am I proposing [the semantic intentions necessity thesis] as a truth that will
obtain in, as philosophers say, all “possible worlds”? Offered in these
extreme forms, the claim connecting meaning with persons would be
implausible, I think, because if we want to fantasize, we can imagine, for
example, impersonal or inanimate entities somehow forming themselves into
what look like words and sentences that in fact turn out to convey accurate
information.35

Smith then presents three examples that originate in my comments on
a prior draft of this discussion. Let me present the examples in their
original form. Let us call this Delphic Desert Wind:
When you go out to the desert near the Mexican border and wait around
for a while at a certain spot, well-formed expressions appear. Here are three
examples:

35.

Id. at 111.
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On January 3, 2002, the following letters appeared in the sand,
“Tomorrow, there will be an unusual hail storm in the Kearny
Mesa area. Park your car in the garage.” The reader parks his
car in the garage that night, and avoids the damage inflicted on
his neighbor’s cars.
On April 7, 2001, the following letters appeared in the sand,
“Buy stock in Amalgamated Widgets and hang onto it for a year.
Then sell.” The reader does not follow the advice, but the stock
triples during the one-year period, and then falls back to its
original value within a few weeks.
On October 8, 2002, the following letters appear in the sand:
“There is a really good deal on Charmin at Costco.” The reader
goes to Costco, and buys one of those enormous containers of
Charmin at half the usual price.

Is there any explanation for this phenomenon that does not include semantic
meaning for the marks in the sand? A reader reads the marks, and the marks
communicate to the reader. The reader is not the author of the marks or of
their meaning. The meaning comes into the world independently of the
reader. The marks successfully convey meaning to the reader.

In response to Delphic Desert Wind, Smith now writes:
I think Solum is right: we can imagine such a world—in fact, we just did—
and that possibility suggests that the claim connecting meaning with persons
is not an assertion of logical necessity or an a priori claim applicable to all
possible worlds. . . . But Solum goes on to observe of his hypothetical
communications by inanimate objects that “[i]n the actual world, this will
never happen”; and that of course is the point. In our world, or within the
ontological inventories that most of us employ, persons have the capacity to
form and convey semantic meanings. Impersonal objects (such as rocks and
rivers and teapots—and marks on a page) do not have this capacity; at most
they can serve to convey persons’ meanings.36

It is very important that we get clear about what Smith is saying here.
Recall Smith’s thesis: “[T]he meaning of a legal text is necessarily
given by—indeed, is basically identical with—the semantic intentions
of an author or authors of some sort.”37 Smith has now clarified. His
claim can still be interpreted as a modal claim about necessity of a
particular sort—which we can call nomological and historical
necessity. In all possible worlds that share the history of the actual
world and its physical laws, each and every well-formed expression
with semantic meaning is brought into being through the agency of
some person.
Given this understanding, we can make two observations about
Smith’s argument. First, it does not support the semantic intentions
necessity thesis. The argument does not establish that the meaning of
texts is identical to author’s intentions; rather, it establishes that

36.
37.
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intentional actions by authors are the necessary causes of texts—
given the history and physical laws of the actual world. But causation
and identity are two different relationships. Establishing that X is a
necessary cause of Y is not the same as establishing that X and Y are
identical.
Second, Smith’s causal claim—that things like “rocks and rivers
and teapots—and marks on a page” lack the capacity to form and
convey meaning is ambiguous and potentially misleading.38 Notice
that there are two separate claims—one about the capacity to “form
meaning” and the other about the capacity to “convey meaning.” Let
us deal with meaning formation first and then consider conveying.
Smith does not tell us what he means by “form meaning,” but it
seems reasonable to assume that formation is a causal process. Rivers
lack the capacity to form meaning because they operate according to
causal laws that do not permit them to create syntactically wellformed expressions. Well, that is not quite true. One can imagine a
river or the wind writing a well-formed sentence. It is not really
impossible. It is just very unlikely. The best that we expect that
rivers could do would be to inscribe a very rough approximation of a
very short word.
Notice, however, that the formation claim as applied to “marks on a
page” is very odd. On one level, this claim seems trivial. Marks on a
page can be well-formed expressions, but they cannot themselves
form new well-formed expressions. How can a sentence write a
sentence? Of course, the individual marks can form a well-formed
expression; in that sense, it is perfectly obvious that Smith’s claim
would be incorrect. Moreover, there is a special category of marks on
a page—expressions in a programming language—that actually can
cause well-formed expressions to come into being. These days we
have all had the experience of interacting with nonpersons—computer
programs—that can form well-formed expressions that communicate
semantic meaning to us. For example, you can interact with a
program that will tell you when your flight is departing. Of course,
humans wrote the program (or in some cases, wrote the program that
wrote the program). But all this does is establish that the agency of
some person is a necessary part of the causal chain—not that meaning
is identical to the semantic intentions of some person. Indeed, the
38.

Id. at 111.
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case of computer programs that produce well-formed expressions
with semantic meaning actually disproves the claim that meaning is
necessarily identical to the semantic intentions of some author or
authors. Computer programs can be very complex indeed, and many
actually existing programs can create sentences that the author of the
program did not and could not have anticipated. One reason for this
is that computers can execute routines that are beyond the capacity of
any human. Of course, computer-generated meanings are dependent
on human causes, but dependence does not entail identity.
We can now turn to Smith’s second claim, that things like “rocks
and rivers and teapots—and marks on a page” lack the capacity to
convey meaning. Well, that claim is clearly false. Rocks, rivers, and
teapots may lack the capacity to convey meaning, but marks on a page
surely do have that capacity. In fact, Smith himself says that marks
on a page can convey meaning.39 So, I think we need to assume that
Smith did not mean what he said. That is, the only way to make sense
of Smith is to assume that the meaning of what he wrote is different
than the meaning which he intended the text to convey. That is, to
make sense of Smith, we must assume that the semantic
intentions necessity thesis is false. The meaning of what Smith said
is not identical with Smith’s semantic intentions.
How can this be? What can explain the gap between what we say
and what we intend to say? Smith argues, persuasively, that the gap
cannot be explained by dictionary meaning.40 Dictionaries merely
report patterns of usage; they do not legislate meaning. And the
meaning of well-formed expressions are not a simple concatenation of
the meanings of individual words—language does not work like that.
But Smith is wrong, I think, to claim that “[t]he same point applies to
linguistic conventions.”41 He writes:
What sense would it make, after all, to say, “Although speakers in this
culture intend this phrase to mean X, and although listeners understand
speakers who use the phrase to mean X, nonetheless according to the
‘conventions of the language’ the sentence actually means Y.” If persons
understand that speakers use the phrase to have a particular meaning, then it
is nonsensical to suppose that there could be conventions that “really” give it
a different meaning.42

But this example simply does not do the work that Smith needs it to
do. If the speaker intends X and the audience understands X, the
reason is that there is a linguistic convention that the utterance means
39.
40.
41.
42.
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X in the circumstances in which it is uttered.
The crucial case for Smith is one in which an author or speaker
utters expression E and under the linguistic convention that applies in
the circumstances, E means Y. The audience understands E to mean
Y. The speaker, however, intends to mean X. For example:
Ben says, “That song is really cool.”
Alice says, “Yeah, I love it.”
Ben says, “But it is cool. How can you love it?”
Alice says, “I love it, because it is so cool.”
Ben says, “But when I said it was cool, I meant it was awful.”
Alice says, “That may be what you meant to say, but it was not what you
said. Do you live under a rock? ‘Cool’ means cool, hip, happening, with
it.”
Ben says, “No, cool means bad.”
Alice says, “Now you get it. That song was bad. It was phat.”

Alice tells Ben that his communication misfired—he said something
he did not mean. Of course, that case is quite different from one in
which Ben and Alice share a special, nonstandard convention, as in
the following example:
Ben says, “When I say cool, I mean awful.”
Alice says, “Okay, cool means awful.”
Ben says, “That song is really cool.”
Alice says, “I do not agree. It is an awesome song.”
Ben says, “But it is cool. How can you love it?”
Alice says, “It is not cool in that funny way you mean cool. I love it because
its cool-cool. Really cool.”

We can all agree that in this second example, Ben’s communication
has not misfired. The important point is that there is a difference
between the two cases. In case one, the meaning of what Ben says
departs from his semantic intentions. In case two, the meaning of
what Ben says is identical to his semantic intentions. If Smith’s
analysis were correct, then this difference could not obtain. But it does
obtain, and hence Smith’s equation of meaning with the semantic
intentions of the author cannot be correct.
One way to get at this issue is via Paul Grice’s distinction between
speaker’s meaning and sentence meaning.43 Grice’s idea of speaker’s
43. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy,
and Legal Positivism, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493, 510 n.57 (2005) (citing PAUL
GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 112-116 (1989)); B. Jessie Hill, Putting
Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104
MICH. L. REV. 491, 506 n.80 (2005) (citing PAUL GRICE, Utterer’s Meaning,
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meaning is actually quite familiar. We get at the idea of speaker’s
meaning all the time in ordinary conversations: “What did he mean by
that?” In the context of legal texts, we ask questions like: “What did
the legislature mean by the provision?” “What did the judge mean by
that sentence in the opinion?” “What did the Framers mean by that
clause in the Constitution?”
Grice contended that speaker’s meaning, in turn, can be analyzed in
terms of a speaker’s (or author’s) intentions. His point is illustrated
by the following thought experiment:
[I]magine that you have stopped at night at an intersection. The driver of
another car flashes her lights at you, and you make the inference the reason
for her doing this is that she wants to cause you to believe that your lights
are not on. And based on this inference, you now do, in fact, realize that
your lights are not on.

In this example, the meaning of the flashing lights is the product of
the following complex intention—as explicated by Richard Grandy
and Richard Warner:
The driver flashes her lights intending:
(1) that you believe that your lights are not on;
(2) that you recognize her intention (1);
(3) that this recognition be part of your reason for believing that
your lights are not on.44
In the case of imperatives, the intention is that the audience (or reader)
perform a certain act on the basis of the reader’s recognition of the
author’s intention that the reader perform the act.
What about sentence meaning? In its simplest (and perhaps
simplified) form, the idea is that words and expressions have standard
meanings—the meanings that are conventional given relevant linguistic
practices. As Hurd puts it, “In other words, the sentence meaning
of a particular utterance can be understood not by reference to the
illocutionary intentions of the speaker, but rather by reference to the
illocutionary intentions that speakers in general have when employing
such an utterance.”45 Hurd goes on to criticize this solution, but I
want to put this sort of controversy to the side at this point.
Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 117, 123
(1989)); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 70, 72 n.7 (2006) (citing PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF
WORDS 26 (1989)).
44. Richard E. Grandy & Richard Warner, Paul Grice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., May 8, 2006, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grice/ (last visited Mar. 26,
2007).
45. Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945, 964 (1990).
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What does Smith have to say about the Gricean distinction between
speaker’s meaning and sentence meaning? He makes three points:
First, philosophers’ references to “sentence meaning” or lawyers’ talk of
“objective meanings” should not be taken to show that words can have a
context-free meaning independent of any author’s semantic intentions.
....
Second, even for the limited purpose of distinguishing normal from
idiosyncratic or deviant language uses, we should be wary of distinctions
between “speaker’s meaning” and “sentence meaning” or “conventional
meaning.”
....
Finally, the limited purposes that may be validly served by distinctions
between speaker’s and sentence meanings, or between “intended” and
“objective” meanings, have scant relevance in any case to the interpretation
of legal enactments.46

Each of these points requires some discussion. Let us take them in
order.
Smith’s first point should now be familiar. This is another version
of the claim that sentence meaning is not independent of authors’
intentions. That is right. But my reply is also familiar: dependence
does not imply equivalence. Thus, the Gricean story about sentence
meaning incorporates intentions in a complex way. Sentence meaning is
dependent on the way language is typically used. Typical use
consists of many exemplars of speaker’s meaning—of the meaning
that particular speakers intend in particular contexts. So, sentence
meaning depends on speaker’s meaning and speaker’s meaning depends
on the intentions of particular speakers. But there is no “typical
speaker” whose intentions determine “speaker’s meaning.” Of course,
we can speak as if there were a typical speaker. That is, we can use
the typical speaker as a heuristic. But the typical speaker is not an
actual person. And because the typical speaker is not an actual person,
the typical speaker does not have actual intentions. And because
there are no such actual intentions, it cannot be the case that sentence
meaning is identical to them.
Recall that Smith’s second point was that “even for the limited
purpose of distinguishing normal from idiosyncratic or deviant
language uses, we should be wary of distinctions between ‘speaker’s
meaning’ and ‘sentence meaning’ or ‘conventional meaning.’”47
46.
47.

SMITH, supra note 1, at 115-17.
Id. at 116.
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Most of Smith’s discussion of this second point does not really
engage Grice’s distinction. We need the distinction between speaker’s
meaning and sentence meaning to make sense of certain kinds of
communication. For speaker’s meaning to get off the ground, the
author must know that the reader is aware of the speaker’s intentions.
This reflexive relationship may not be required for the text to
“mean” in Smith’s sense, but it is certainly required for the text to
“communicate” or “convey” speaker’s meaning. In the case of legal
texts, the conditions for speaker’s meaning frequently do not obtain.
That is, the readers—citizens, lawyers, judges—frequently do not possess
sufficient information about the intentions of the lawmakers—judges,
legislators, Framers—for speaker’s meaning to be conveyed.
Smith’s third and final point was that “the limited purposes that
may be validly served by distinctions between speaker’s and sentence
meanings, or between ‘intended’ and ‘objective’ meanings, have
scant relevance . . . to the interpretation of legal enactments.”48 This
point is based on the same confusion that characterized the second
point—it assumes that sentence meaning is some sort of corrective for
deviant meanings, but that is not even remotely close to Grice’s point.
Smith writes:
Parties to private contracts may sometimes use language in tricky or deviant
ways that courts need to guard against by focusing on what they may choose
(at their and our peril) to call “objective” meanings . . . . But the drafters
and enactors of statutes and constitutional provisions do not tend to be
highly idiosyncratic in their use of language after the manner of, say,
humorists or poets. On the contrary, legislative drafters incline to
dullness—to a numbing standardization—in their expressions.49

Smith’s description of the phenomena is right on target, but he has the
lesson backwards. What Smith calls “numbing standardization” is, in
fact, a result of the communicative situation that Framers and
legislators face. When the author knows that the reader will not know
very much about the author’s intentions, then you had better go with
sentence meanings if you want to communicate. That is, you had
better go with the meanings that can be attributed by readers who
have only the scantiest information about your semantic intentions.
Moreover, there are sound normative reasons to use sentence meaning
rather than speaker’s meaning when we interpret constitutions (or
legislation). Constitutions are intended for a wide audience across
generational and geographic lines. We have very good reason to
adopt the interpretive conventions that will create shared public
48.
49.
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meanings for the Constitution; we have good reasons to eschew
reliance on arcane or private knowledge about the semantic intentions
of the drafters when that knowledge was not publicly available when
the Constitution was ratified.
Recall that Smith talks about “the meaning of a legal text,” and
thereby makes an implicit claim that a text can have only one true or
correct meaning. Smith has no good argument for that claim, and it
seems rather unlikely that he could possibly produce one because it is
perfectly obvious that texts can have multiple meanings—speaker’s
meaning, sentence meaning, and reader’s meanings. On close inspection,
we found that Smith had no real argument for the semantic intentions
necessity thesis. His normative arguments actually undermined rather
than supported the thesis. On close inspection, we found that his claim
about the necessary identity of meanings and semantic intentions was,
in actuality, a claim that persons are causally necessary to the
production of well-formed expressions. Even that modest claim turns
out to be false, but the more important point is that Smith has no
argument against the possibility of sentence meanings that are not
identical with or reducible to speaker’s meanings. That point opens
the door for our return to constitutional texting.
IV. FRAMER’S MEANING AND CLAUSE MEANING
There is an obvious parallelism between Grice’s discussion of
speaker’s meaning and sentence meaning and contemporary debates
in constitutional theory. In that debate, a distinction is drawn between
two forms of originalism—“original meaning originalism” and
“original intentions originalism.” Both forms of originalism are
sometimes contrasted with textualism. In this Part of the essay, I
shall explore this parallelism.
Let us begin with the idea that the Constitution should be
interpreted to have the meaning that was originally intended by the
Framers. I will not bother to recite the many withering criticisms of
this proposal. Original intentions originalism runs into problems in
two situations. First, there is the problem of inadequate information.
If what we are after is the semantic intentions of the Framers, then we
simply do not have the information that we need. Even if we put
aside the complex problem of collective intentions yielded by
multiple drafters and multitudinous ratifiers, we simply do not know
very much about the semantic intentions of the Framers. Oh sure, we
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have lots of information—the records of the Convention, the ratifying
debates, and early debates about the application of the Constitution.
But all of that is simply more text: if knowledge of semantic
intentions is necessary to glean meaning, then adding more text to the
stack of things to be interpreted does not really solve the problem,
does it? Second, there is the problem of too much information.
Sometimes we know more about the Framers’ intentions than was
known at the time the Constitution was ratified. For one thing, we
have the records of the Philadelphia Convention; the ratifiers did not.
We have the full record of ratification, but the actual ratifiers had only
a fragmentary portion of what we have. To the extent that we know
more than they did and that knowledge changes our view of the
Constitution’s meaning, we are on the road to the conclusion that the
ratifiers did not know what they were ratifying.
Both problems suggest that our understanding of constitutional
meaning should be modeled on Grice’s conception of sentence
meaning and not on speaker’s meaning. In the case of a constitution,
speaker’s meaning (or author’s meaning) can be redescribed as
“Framer’s meaning.” Framer’s meaning depends on what the Framers
intended, given what they knew about contemporary ratifiers and
interpreter’s knowledge of their intentions. Likewise, “sentence meaning”
can be redescribed as “clause meaning.” Clause meaning is the meaning
that would be assigned to a clause, on the assumption that the clause
was written with the knowledge that it would be ratified and interpreted
by readers who would have very limited access to information about
the framing and who would be under normative pressure to disregard
any information that was not universally accessible.
The meaning of the Constitution is best understood as the clause
meaning of its provisions. But this does not entail that history and
evidence about original meaning is not relevant to the process of
constitutional interpretation. Clause meaning is not ahistorical or
acontextual. Linguistic conventions change over time. Words and
phrases that once had one public meaning may come, over time, to
acquire another. Of course, in the case of the Constitution, the
Constitution itself acts as a check on this process. That is because the
Constitution itself is public, widely available, and central to our legal
culture. Constitutional usages are likely to be preserved, simply
because they are repeated, studied, quoted, and interpreted. But in
those cases in which the original public meaning of the Constitution
has been swept away by a shift in the linguistic winds, the clause
meaning is the “sentence meaning” that would have been assigned at
the time the Constitution was ratified and not the sentence meaning
that we would assign based on contemporary linguistic practices.
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V. CONCLUSION: HOW TO DO THINGS WITH CLAUSES
In a sense, Smith’s Law’s Quandary is about a search for “the
author”—the person or transcendent being who could supply the
semantic intentions necessary for the law to mean. That search was
motivated by the semantic intentions necessity thesis, a thesis that is
not sustained by Smith’s arguments. I have suggested a different picture
of legal and constitutional meaning—a picture that prominently
features well-formed expressions and sentence meaning. But the picture
of meaning that I paint does not exclude the authors. Quite the
contrary, my picture includes Austinian brushstrokes and Gricean
hues that highlight the idea that we do things with words and the
notion that Framers and ratifiers do things with clauses. Constitutions
are illocutionary acts—they constitute, command, forbid, and empower.
But doing things with clauses is tricky. Constitutional texting lacks
the immediacy and interactivity of instant messaging. When you try
to do things with clauses, the illocutionary uptake may occur centuries
later in a distant locale. Constitutional text messages address unknown
and unknowable readers. If you want your illocutionary act to succeed,
then you need to avoid reliance on special knowledge of your
semantic intentions. Constitutional text messages will work best if
they are constructed from widely shared public meanings.
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